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The society of the former Soviet
Union was militarized. The military
received preferential treatment in the
allocation of resources. Foreign policy
relied heavily on military instruments.
Military needs were used to justify
extraordinary secrecy in matters of
security. 1 As David Holloway notes,
however, the militarization of the Soviet
Mikhail Tsypkin is Associate Professor of
National Security Affairs and Coordinator of
Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Views
and opinions expressed in this paper are the
author's solely, and are not meant to reflect the
views and opinions of the Department of the
Navy or any agency of the U.S. government.
The author would like to express his appreciation
to Roman Laba and Paul Stockton for their
comments.
*David Holloway, "State, Society and the
Military Under Gorbachev," International
Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp.
5-8. Also see Stephen Meyer, "The Sources and
Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking
on Security," International Security, Vol. 13,
No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 124-163; A. Arbatov,
"How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" International
Affairs, No. 4 (April 1989), pp. 31-44; and
Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Soviet Military:
Glasnost' Against Secrecy," Problems of
Communism, Vol. 40 (May-June 1991), pp. 51-
66.
society "had to be explained not in terms
of the influence of the military, but rather
in terms of the priorities of the state,
which were determined by civilian
leaders."2 The military apparently played
a limited political role in the Soviet
regime, but were granted by the
Communist leadership an exclusive
competence in decisions on the weapons
and structure of the armed forces. 3 The
military's relative lack of political clout in
the Soviet system is confirmed by
Gorbachev's ability, as Communist party
leader, to use his dominance over the
military to allow various civilian groups
to violate this exclusive competence.
The onset of Gorbachev's
perestroika and new thinking gave rise to
the hope that Soviet4 society would
^Holloway, "State, Society and the Military," p.
8. A similar point has been made by Stephen
Meyer in "How the Coup (and the Threat)
Collapsed: the Politicization of the Soviet
Military," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3
(Winter 1991/92), p. 12.
^Benjamin S. Lambeth, "A Generation Too Late:
Civilian Analysis and Soviet Military
Thinking," in Derek Leebaert and Timothy
Dickinson, eds. Soviet Strategy and New
Military Thinking (Cambridge University Press,
1992), p. 217.
4The term "Soviet" in reference to military and
other institutions of the former USSR, will be
frequently used here, despite its current
obsolescence, for two reasons. One, the Soviet
military and other institutions clearly existed
until the August 1991 coup. Two, even
immediately after the dissolution of the USSR in
December of 1991, the Armed Forces have
remained, to a considerable degree, the last
"Soviet" institution: while deployed throughout
all the fifteen former union republics, most of
them still continue to be commanded from
Moscow.
become less militarized. Once the conflict
between communism and capitalism was
replaced by international cooperation as
the cornerstone of the Soviet security
policy, the rationale for militarization
disappeared. 5 Indeed, a de-militarization
of Soviet society and its post-Soviet
successors has begun in earnest: defense
budgets and military manpower and
weapons, both conventional and nuclear,
have been cut, a global withdrawal from
Berlin to Cam Rahn Bay has been
undertaken, and secrecy has been
replaced by glasnost' to an unprecedented
degree.
Can the demilitarization of the
Russian Federation, the main successor
state to the former Soviet Union, be
reversed? The political system, which
both encouraged the militarization of
society and denied the military political
power, is now gone. Is it possible that as
the civilian institutions of the Soviet state
have crumbled, the military has been in
fact increasing their relative political
power, and will become a major political
influence in the new Russia, leading to a
remilitarization?
To answer this question, I have
investigated the Soviet military's role in
5Holloway, "State, Society and the Military
under Gorbachev," pp. 5-8. Also see Meyer,
"The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New
Political Thinking on Security," pp. 124-163;
Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" pp.
31-44; and Tsypkin, "The Soviet Military:
Glasnost" Against Secrecy," pp. 51-66.
the political process from the preparation
for the unsuccessful conservative coup
d'etat in August 1991, until the immediate
aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. I have concluded that the
military's opportunity and motivation to
exert political influence have definitely
increased. The military's actual political
influence, however, has been so far
circumscribed by the traditional reliance
on civilian politicians for legitimation of
any political intervention by the armed
forces, by the military's concentration on
their narrow sectional interests, and by
the disarray in the high command, which
has resulted from the collapse of the old
USSR state structures and their
replacement by the governments of the
new Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). In the face of the weakness
of civil society and democratic political
institutions, the military will be a critical
component of any power coalition in
Russia and other successor states. Their
political influence, however, might lead
to a remilitarization of society only if
Russian hyper-nationalism becomes a
major political force.
The failed conservative coup
d'etat of August 1991 burst the bubble of
endless speculation in Moscow and in the
West about the likelihood of military
intervention in the politics of what was
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
in order to revert the process of reform.
Plans for the attempted coup gave the
military a crucial role. Then Defense
Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov was a
member of the State Committee on the
State of Emergency. 6 Military units were
brought into the streets of Moscow as a
symbol of the irreversibility of the coup.
The military was instructed to maintain
public order in cooperation with the KGB
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 7 The
city governments of Moscow and
Leningrad were effectively transferred
under the control of the commanders of
respective military districts. In Moscow,
commandants of military academies and
commanders of military units were
appointed to run the city's thirty-three
boroughs. 8
The military, however, proved to
be an unreliable instrument for carrying
out the coup. The High Command was
split between the service chiefs
supporting the coup (the Air Defense
Forces and the Ground Forces minus the
Airborne Troops) and those opposing it
(the Air Force, the Strategic Rocket
Forces and the Airborne Troops). Some
troops on the streets of Moscow began to
fraternize with the anti-coup
demonstrators; some of their commanders
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 157, August
20, 1991.
'"Ne general'skoe eto delo...," Komsomol'skaya
pravda,Augusl27, 1991.
°Ibid; "Prikaz komendanta goroda Moskvy no.
2," Central TV, August 21, 1991, in Soviet
Media News and Features Digest, August 21,
1991, pp. 2, 3.
said they would not use force to
implement the orders of the new
Emergency Committee (State Commiitee
for the State of Emergency). In
Leningrad, the democratic mayor,
Anatolii S( chak, talked the local military
commander out of bringing troops into
the streets, as ordered by the Emergency
Committee. 9 This was compounded by
similar hesitation and splits in the KGB
and the police forces of the MVD-the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. 10 Its
enforcement instruments blunted, the
coup failed. Why did the military try to
intervene into politics? Why was their
intervention so half-hearted?
In the late 1970's Timothy Colton
foresaw a situation remarkably similar to
that of the 1990's:
One can envisage ... a
reformist civilian leadership





adversaries such as would alarm
military leaders.. ..The
combination ... of multiple
assaults on officers' key
interests with the tension s of
waging a difficult war-pcrhaps
... an embroilment with
guerrillas ... --could
conceivably bring about
intervention [of the military in
politics], either unilateral or
9Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 158, August
21, 1991.
l^Mark Galeotti, "The Role of the Security
Forces," Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 36
(September 6, 1991), pp. 6-7.
(more likely) in coalition with
some civilians. 11
Indeed, a set of remarkably
similar circumstances after Gorbachev's
accession to power resulted in a
crescendo of concerns about possible
military intervention in Soviet politics
over the last two years. These concerns
began to be expressed after the military
played the leading role in the massacre of
nationalist demonstrators in Tbilisi,
Georgia, on April 9, 1989. Suspicions
were voiced that the massacre was a
result of a plot by party, KGB and
military hard-liners to terrorize the
democratic opposition after its successes
in ousting party officials in the elections
to the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies. 12 The first rumors of a
^Timothy J. Colton, Commissars,
Commanders, and Civilian Authority, The
Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 288.
l^For early maneuvers of the conservative forces
to forestall the democrats' electoral success in the
spring of 1989, see Esther B. Fein, "Soviet
Conservatives Try to Turn Back the Clock on
Gorbachev's Policies," New York Times,
February 27, 1989, p. A3. On the massacre in
Tbilisi, see "Vystuplenie E.A. Shevardnadze na
plenume TsK Kompartii Gruzii 14 aprelya 1989
g.," Pravda, April 16, 1989; T.G. Shavgulidze,
"Zaklyuchenie komissii Verkhovnogo Soveta
Gruzinskoy SSR po rassledovaniyu
obstoyatel'stv, imevshikh mesto 9 aprelya 1989
goda v gorode Tbilisi," Zarya vostoka, October
5, 1989; Anatoliy Sobchak, "O sobytiiakh v g.
Tbilisi," Izvestiya, December 29, 1989; "Voiska
vykhodiat na ploshchad'," Ogonyok, No. 7
(January 1990); "Zakliuchenie komissii s'yezda
narodnykh deputatov SSSR po rassledovaniiu
sobytii, imevshikh mesto v g. Tbilisi 9 aprelya
1989 goda," Smena, January 3, 1990:
"Chrezvychainaia situatsiia," Novoe vremia. No.
possible military coup date back to the
summer of 1989, just after the democratic
opposition in the first Congress of USSR
People's Deputies took the initial steps
towards establishing itself as a credible
political force. 13 Throughout 1990, the
press debated the likelihood of a military
coup. 14 A chain of events in the end of
1990-beginning of 1991 heightened such
concerns.
Paratroops in full combat gear
conducted unannounced exercises around
Moscow in September 1990. 15 Mikhail
8 (March 1990); "Vokrug istiny," Ogonyok, No.
10 (February 1990).
1-W. Ostrovskiy, "Dmitriy Yazov: Glasnost'
ukreplyaet bezopasnosnt'," Moskovskie novosti,
July 16, 1989; N. Gevorkyan, "Voennyy




gazeta, February 22, 1990; Aleksandr
Nikolaevich Yakovlev, "Sotsializm: ot mechty
k real'nosti," Kommunist, No. 4 (March 1990);
Vladimir Sokolov, "K rynku-pod prikrytiem
armii?" Literaturnaya gazeta, September 12,
1990; Andrei Nuykin, "Voennyy perevorot: pro
i kontra," Moskovksie novosti, September 16,
1990; Col. General Boris Gromov, "Ne nuzhno
nagnetat' strasti," Moskovksie novosti, October
14, 1990; Andranik Migranyan, "Segodnya
perevorot nevozmozhen. A zavtra?" Moskovksie
novosti, December 2, 1990; D. Tabachnik,
"Taynaya vecherya' s uchastiem TsRU?"
Komsomol'skoe znamya, December 16, 1990.
**For arguments supporting the idea that a coup
was in the wings, see Major M. Pustobaev,
"Chto nam pishut iz armii," Komsomol'skaya
pravda, October 12, 1990; A. Pankratov, "A kto-
to podumal—ucheniya idut...," Komsomol'skaya
pravda, September 26, 1990; Grigoriy
Zaychenko, Sergei Mitrofanov, "Perevorot
namechen, no poka otlozhen?" Kommersant, No.
38 (September 24 - October 1, 1990). For
denials of coup attempts in September, see N.
Krivomazov, "Kak desantniki na Moskvu
khodili," Pravda, September 19, 1990; V. Urban,
"Lozh' o 'voennom perevorote'," Krasnaya
Gorbachev held a confrontational meeting
with a group of military officers-
members of Soviets on November 13,
1990. 16 On November 17, 1990
People's Deputy-Colonel Viktor Alksnis
issued an ultimatum to Gorbachev to
restore "order" within thirty days or
resign. 17 Subsequently, Gorbachev
turned toward a more conservative
course. 18 Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze resigned on December 20,
1990, partially blaming his decision on
attacks by the military. 19 The decision to
implement an unprecedented joint
patrolling of some cities by police and the
military was made on December 29,
1990. 20 A bloody crackdown was
attempted by the military against their
target of choice—the Lithuanian
nationalists, in Vilnius on January 13,
1991. Troops in large numbers were
introduced into Moscow on March 28,
zvezda, September 27, 1990; Vyacheslav
Lukashevich, "Veter strakha v parusakh
perestroyki," Krasnaya zvezda, September 29,
1990; N. Velan, "Lish' by poshumet'...,"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, September 29, 1990; S.
Shatalov,"Zachem vvodit' v zabluzhdenie,"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, October 21, 1990.
16"Armiyu ne otdelif ot naroda," Krasnaya
zvezda, November 15, 1990.
17 Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 222,
November 23, 1990.
^Gorbachev's former economic advisor,
Stanislav Shatalin, attributed this turn to
military pressure; see S. Shatalin, "Nel'zya
borot'sya so zlom pri pomoshchi zla,"
Komsomol'skaya pravda, January 22, 1991.
^"Chetvertyy s'yezd narodnykh deputatov
SSSR," Izvestiya, December 21, 1990, p. 5.
™Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 19, January
28, 1991.
1991, in order to intimidate Boris
Yeltsin's supporters in the Russian
Federation's Congress of People's
Deputies and those Muscovites prepared
to demonstrate in his defense. These
events culminated in the August 1991
attempted coup d' etat.
The post-coup events confirmed
the military's continuing political
influence. After the announcement of the
dissolution of the USSR on December 8
:
1991, several high-ranking military
officers stated their opposition to the
dissolution, and threatened an armed
forces intervention against it. Russia's
President Boris Yeltsin immediately
sought the support of the armed forces to
ensure the dissolution of the old regime.
Then President of the USSR Gorbachev
also sought the support of the military in
his opposition to the dissolution. Yeltsin
received the military's support, while
Gorbachev was denied it.21
The military's support for Yeltsin
did not end their attempts to exert political
influence. On January 17, the Officers'
Assembly (a gathering of officers
delegated by all units of the armed forces)
had a stormy meeting, attended by Yeltsin
and Kazakhstan's President Nursultan
Nazarbaev. It formed a Coordinating
Council tasked with "advising" the
civilian leadership on military policies, a
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 233,
December 10, 1991; No. 236, December 13,
1991; No. 237, December 16, 1991.
clear attempt to short-circuit the chain of
command appointed by civilian
politicians.22
A useful theoretical framework
for measuring the military's political
influence has been developed by S.E.
Finer, who suggested that military
interventions in politics are conditioned
by the political strengths and weaknesses
of the military, and its disposition and
opportunity to intervene. 23 Their
disposition to intervene depends on how
the military sees its role vis-a-vis the
government and the state, on the
military's desire to prevent civilian
"meddling" in its "professional" matters,
on the military's reluctance (or lack of
such) to perform police functions. 24 The
military may be predisposed to intervene
if they are motivated by a sense of the
soldier's manifest destiny, as well as by
self-interest. 25 The opportunity to
intervene arises when civilian power
becomes dependent on the military
because of war or a domestic political
crisis, or when civilian authority is
weak. 26 The political strengths of the
military include their "centralization,
hierarchy, discipline," as well as the
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 12, January
20, 1992; No. 21, January 31, 1992; No. 22,
February 3, 1992.
2
^S. E. Finer, The Man On Horseback, 2nd
enlarged edition, revised and updated (Boulder,





public's perception of the military's
virtues: bravery, self-abnegation,
patriotism. 27 The major political
weakness of the military is a lack of
legitimacy of their rule.28
This approach appears to attribute
equal importance to factors both internal
and external to the military. Samuel
Huntington suggests that "the most
important causes of military intervention
in politics are not military but political,
and reflect not the social and
organizational characteristics of the
military establishment but the political and
institutional structure of the society."29 A
recent study of the politicization of the
Soviet military has shown convincingly
that the political environment is the clue to
understanding the problems of the armed
forces of the former Soviet Union.30
This study focuses primarily on the
political factors crucial in affecting the
Soviet/Russian military's ability and
motivation to intervene in politics,
particularly on the interrelated issues of
civilian control, legitimacy of military
rule, and Russian nationalism.
27Ibid., pp. 8, 9.
28 Ibid., pp. 12-19.
2
^Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968) p. 194.
™Meyer, "How the Coup (and the Threat)
Collapsed," pp. 5-38.
Historical Background
It has been frequently said that a
military coup in the Soviet Union is
unlikely because there is no tradition of
successful military coups in
Russian/Soviet history.31 This is indeed
so. But it is equally well established in
the Russian/Soviet tradition that
whenever the civilian authority is
weakened by a succession of crises or by
a revolutionary upheaval, no government
can survive without controlling and/or
receiving political support from the
military. On several crucial occasions
during the last three centuries, the military
decided the fate of several political leaders
by extending or denying them military
support. At the beginning of his reign,
Peter the Great's success in his power
struggle was closely linked to the
changing loyalties of the Moscow
musketeers.32 In the eighteenth century,
"the real force behind ... Russia's palace
revolutions ... was the regiments of the
guards which Peter had founded and
which he had raised to the position of one
of the most influential government
organs."33 The plot against Paul I, who
31 Stephen Foye, "The Case for a Coup:
Gorbachev or the Generals?" Report on the
USSR, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 11, 1991), p. 1.
^Michael T. Florinsky, Russia. A History And
an Interpretation, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan,
1958), pp. 308-314.
33 Ibid., p. 432.
was assassinated in 1801, would have
been impossible without the help of the
military, especially the Guards, who were
outraged by their mistreatment at the
hands of the unbalanced monarch. 34 The
first attempted revolution in Russia came
in the form of a military coup in
December 1825, which failed because the
majority of the capital's military garrison
remained loyal to the Tsar. 35 As social
turmoil increased in the late nineteenth-
early twentieth centuries, the Russian
monarchy relied more and more on the
military for maintaining internal order, to
suppress revolts and impose martial
law. 36
In the fateful year of 1917, the
lack of support for Nicholas II on the part
of his military was crucial in his decision
to abdicate and thus end the Russian
monarchy. 37 In the same year, Lenin
destroyed the Provisional Government's
control of the military, while winning the
loyalty of some military units deployed in
the capital; without this success the
communist revolution in Russia could
34Ibid., pp. 625-627.
^Michael T. Florinsky, Russia. A History And
an Interpretation, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan,
1958), p. 750.
3
"Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet
State," Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Fall 1980), p.
3; William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military
Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1985), passim.
3
' Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial
Russia, p. 261; Richard Pipes, The Russian
Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990),
pp. 273-286, 309-313.
have never happened. After the
Bolshevik coup, most of the attacks
against the new regime were led by the
officers of the old army, while the
communist government could not have
won the civil war without the tens of
thousands of former Tsarist officers,
forced or attracted to serve in the Red
Army.
The removal of Trotsky from the
Red Army command was a crucial step in
Stalin's campaign against his arch-
enemy. Stalin, who jealously guarded
his power against any personal or
institutional challenges, made a special
effort, through a mixture of terror and
privileges, to ensure the military's
political quiescence. No other
government branch was purged as
thoroughly or urgently as the Red Army
during the Great Terror—probably
because Stalin saw the military as the
greatest potential threat to his personal
power in any crisis; once the military was
purged, Stalin felt free to unleash
unlimited terror against the whole
society. 38 The 1953 coup by the
Politburo against secret police chief
Lavrentiy Beria would have been
unthinkable without the direct
involvement of some high-ranking
38Adam B. Ulam, Stalin. The Man and His Era
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 448-450,
459.
military officers and of substantial
numbers of troops.39
The refusal by Minister of
Defense Marshal Georgiy Zhukov to
support Nikita Khrushchev's opponents
played an important role in the failure of
the 1957 attempted coup. Khrushchev's
eventual loss of support among the
military emboldened the plotters who
overthrew him in 1964. The military in
Russian and Soviet history never took
power for itself. The Russian/Soviet
political elites, however, have generally
found it impossible to keep or achieve
power without active support from the
military, because of the country's lack of
representative institutions, vast ethnic
diversity and sheer size.
Motives for Intervention
During Gorbachev's years in
power and since his fall last December,
the Soviet military has accumulated many
of the traditional motives for political
intervention. It may be motivated to
intervene in politics in order to prevent
what they perceive as civilian intervention
into what is "properly" their affairs. This
tendency towards military syndicalism--
that is, the belief that only the military is
3"a. Skorokhodov, "Kak nas 'gotovili na voynu'
s Beriyey," Literaiurnaya gazeia, July 27, 1988;
S. Bystrov, "Zadanie osobogo svoystva,"
Krasnaya zvezda, March 18, 1988, March 19,
1988, March 20, 1988.
8
competent to judge military policy—has
been very prominent in the USSR. The
first five years of Gorbachev's rule have
been characterized by the imposition of
civilian views on a number of issues of
military policy. The potential for conflict
has been unusually great because of the
extreme militarization of Soviet society:
the military has traditionally viewed
everything, from high school education to
rock music to defense industry
conversion for civilian uses, as within its
area of competence.40
Many developments under
Gorbachev have harmed the military's
self-interest and prestige. The
withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the
impending eviction from the whole
Western periphery of the former USSR
represent assaults on the "emotional
geography" (to use S. E. Finer's term) of
the Soviet Armed Forces. After all, these
areas were the scenes of the great
victories by the Red Army in World War
II, and the presence of Soviet Armed
Forces there provided a living link with
these important memories. Writer and
^For an example of the debate on civilian
competence in military affairs, see Arbatov,
"How Much Defence Is Sufficient?", pp. 31-44;
Major General Yu. Lyubimov, "O dostatochnosti
oborony i nedostatke kompetentnosti,"
Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil. No. 16 (August
1989), pp. 21-26; Lt. General Ye. Volkov, "Ne
razyasnyaet, a zatumanivaet," Krasnaya zvezda,
September 28, 1989; and Norman M. Naimark
and David E. Powell, "Moscow's Cult of
Militarism," National Interest, No. 4 (Summer
1986), pp. 53-64.
newspaper editor Aleksandr Prokhanov,
one of the most eloquent conservative
spokesmen in Moscow, thus expressed
this sentiment as Soviet troops began
withdrawing from Eastern Europe: "the
bones of Russian infantrymen are turning
over in their forgotten graves."41
Moreover, the economic geography of the
Soviet Armed Forces makes the retreat
painful: the rule of the thumb has been
that, with few exceptions, the
westernmost officer billets are the best,
while the easternmost are the worst, as
far as living conditions and availability of
food and consumer goods are concerned.
The dissolution of the USSR on
December 21, 1991, has resulted in the
prospect of the former Soviet armed
forces being split among several
successor states, something generally
unpopular among the officer corps.42
The simultaneous withdrawal
from the Third World has been also quite
damaging to the military's self-interest
and prestige. Being posted to 6 .a or
Iraq used to mean access to hard currency
and goods unavailable at home-and thus
an opportunity to tap the Soviet black
market for considerable personal
enrichment. Soviet involvement in proxy
41 Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Tragediya tsentralizma
est' tragediya prolitoy krovi...," Literaturnaya
Rossiya, January 5. 1990.
4
^An opinion poll of the delegates to the January
1992 Officers' Assembly showed that 67 percent
of them wanted to continue with unified armed
forces of the CIS. See RFEIRL Daily Report,
No. 12, January 20, 1992.
wars against the United States throughout
the world and far from the traditional
Russian sphere of interest confirmed the
superpower status of the Soviet military.
The retreat from these conflicts signified
the crumbling of the Soviet military's
global reach, and doomed their military
clients to a more or less imminent defeat.
The crushing of the Soviet-trained and
Soviet-equipped Iraqi military by the
United States and its allies must have
been especially humiliating for the Soviet
generals.
The deteriorating economy has
had a painful impact on military officers.
Those transferred back to the Soviet
Union from Eastern Europe have
frequently been left without housing and
without much hope for it. Many of them
were transferred to the Baltic states, and
are now in fear of an imminent new
eviction. Thousands of officers
discharged from active duty have to find
new jobs at a time of anticipated high
unemployment. The salaries of active
duty officers compare very unfavorably
with the incomes of those operating in the
nascent market economy. Cuts in the
armed forces' size have made military
careers look unpromising.
The military has a primarily
narrow sectional interest in political
matters: the well-being of the officer
corps, and the protection of defense
policy-making from "incompetent"
civilian intervention. Even during the
emotional moments of the August coup,
officers' self-interest played an important
role: a detachment of paratroopers asked
for a pledge to improve their housing
situation as a condition for defending
Yeltsin's government.43 The decision to
give an oath of loyalty to Ukraine by a
large number of officers based there was
apparently motivated by their fear of
losing jobs, by the Russian government's
failure to provide for officers who have to
leave Ukraine, and by Ukraine's decision
to offer salaries and benefits higher than
those in the forces under CIS/Russian
command.44
An opinion poll of participants in
the January 17, 1992 Officers' Assembly
showed that about 90 per cent of them
were in favor of resurrecting the old
USSR. Taken in isolation, this figure
appears to reflect a strong motivation to
intervene in politics to settle an issue of
the broadest political importance. The
same opinion poll showed that 71 per
cent were in favor of the military
establishment having a decisive influence
on the government's military policy.45 In
another opinion poll, officers from ten
regiments deployed in Russia, although
4 3Mikhail Sokolov, "Slovo protiv broni,"
Sobesednik, No. 35 (August 1991).
44Vera Kuznetsova, "Sevastopol' poteryan dlya
Ukrainy," Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 1.1, 1992;
Lyudmila Savel'yeva, "O chem zabyl mayor
Astakhov," Izvestiya, March 3, 1992.
4
^Aleksandr Putko, "Nastroeniya v armii
bespokoyat i samikh voennykh," Nezavisimaya
gazeta, February 5, 1992.
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strongly disapproving (56 per cent) of
Yeltsin's reforms, believed
overwhelmingly (90 per cent) that
governing Russia should be left to
professional politicians. 46 These
attitudes indicate the officers'
preoccupation with their own situation,
made especially precarious by the
dissolution of the Union, and a desire to
exert pressure on the government to
defend their self-interest. Conspicuously
absent is a strong ambition to implement
their own broad political agenda.
To sum it up, the Soviet military
has strong, although limited, motives for
intervention into politics in order to
redress their grievances and obtain better
conditions. Has the opportunity to
intervene in politics been there?
Opportunity to Intervene
Increased dependence of the
civilian government on the military leaves
the latter in a better position to intervene
in politics. War, for instance, can
increase such dependence. Gorbachev,
however, was lucky and insightful
enough to pull out of Afghanistan and
thus diminish the military's role in the
4 6 p. Makarov, "84 protsenta
voennosluzhashchikh schitayut, chto sotsial'naya
napryazennost' vozrastaet," Krasnaya zvezda,
March 6, 1992.
political equation in the Kremlin in the
late 1980's.
Civilian dependence on the
military can also increase if the civilian
government has to rule by force. As
centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet Union
grew in 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev's
government came dangerously close to
rule by force. In late 1990, for instance,
eleven cities or regions of the Soviet
Union (all of them outside of the Russian
Federation) were under what amounts to
martial law.47 . It is possible that what
Gorbachev's conservative critics
described as his lack of decisiveness in
using force was at least partially rooted in
his realization that by using military force
to rule he was increasing the already
dangerously high level of dependence on
the military in the face of a near collapse
of the civilian government.
The dissolution of the Soviet
Union has made use of the military to rule
by force more difficult, as long as the
armed forces are at least theoretically
subordinated to the non-existent
"commonwealth" authority. The passive
role of the CIS military in the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict around Nagornyy
Karabakh confirms this difficulty. Once
the inevitable happens, and the bulk of
the former Soviet armed forces pass
under the control of Russia, the military
^
'Radio Liberty Daily Report, November 29,
1990.
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may again be used to rule by force in case
of economic and/or ethnic unrest in the
Russian Federation, or conflicts with
other successor states.
Open political crisis, instability
and the absence of a legitimate
government create an opportunity for
military intervention into politics. The
Soviet political system lacked legitimacy,
including an accepted mechanism for the
transfer of power. This was
demonstrated by Gorbachev's continuous
fiddling with the constitution to give
himself more power, his staying on as
General Secretary of the CPSU until after
the August coup, and his refusal to
subject himself to a popular vote. Wide
public recognition on who or what
constitutes sovereign authority was
absent at least until after the August coup,
as demonstrated by the so-called "war of
laws" between the "center" and the Union
republics.
The establishment of independent
states on the ruins of the union has
alleviated the situation, especially in the
case of Russia, which had been torn
between its traditional imperial and new
nation-state identities. Russia's new
government, however, can easily lose its
legitimacy, because its citizens' hopes of
speedy benefits from economic reform
are being increasingly frustrated. In
addition, just as before the August coup,
substantial segments of the public have
little or no attachment to the new civil
institutions. Although the level of public
mobilization is quite high in the large
cities, even there public associations are
still weak (with the exception of the better
organized non-Russian nationalist
movements), and public mobilization in
small towns and rural areas is quite low.
Thus, the military had an ample
opportunity to intervene in politics by
August 1991, and is likely to still have it
in the future.
Military Centralization and Discipline
The main political strength of a
military establishment is arguably the
centralized, rigidly hierarchical nature of
the institution, which may make it into a
powerful instrument for political
intervention. The fact that we talk about
"the military" indicates that we tend to
view even very large armed forces with
complex structure as a single institutional
actor, tightly controlled by its high
command. There was little direct
evidence in the recent past of interservice
rivalry, or disobedience or mutinies
significant enough to disrupt the
centralized control of the Soviet
military. 48 Yet, even in the pre-
Gorbachev days, there existed factors that
4
°The mutiny in the 1970's on a destroyer in the
Baltic appears to have been an exception.
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were potentially damaging to the cohesion
of the military.
The ethnic composition of the
commissioned officer corps was
becoming increasingly different from that
of the enlisted conscripts, who were also
becoming less ethnically uniform. While
97 per cent of commissioned and non-
commissioned officers are ethnic
Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and
Tatars, about thirty eight per cent of the
conscript pool came from Central Asia
and Transcaucasia.49 As the social
conditions in the Soviet Union
deteriorated, the standards of living of
junior and even middle-ranking officers
declined, while the top generals, like the
rest of the privileged nomenklatura,
preserved and even continued to expand
their luxuries.50
These threats to the military's
cohesion have become much more
pronounced since 1985. The tidal wave
of various forms of nationalism made
ethnic conflicts in the armed forces a
serious problem by the summer of 1991.
The economic collapse, combined with a
rapid and poorly prepared withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Eastern Europe,
reduced the junior and middle-ranking
officers' standards of living even more.
4
^A. Pusev, "I snova raschet na 'chudo'?"
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh 5/7, No. 9 (May
1990), pp. 43-47.
SOviadimir Sergeev, "Dachnye privilegii pri
svete gasnosti," Ogonyok, No. 13 (March 1990),
pp. 17-19.
Glasnost', at the same time, made them
more aware of the privileges enjoyed by
the top-ranking officers. Deteriorating
living conditions have led to increasing
corruption and subversion of discipline.
The most glaring examples can be found
in the Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany, where officers defect with
secret weapons, political officers make a
brisk business reselling Mercedes cars,
soldiers rummage the German dumps in
search of consumer goods, and the chain
of command has turned into a system in
which the stronger pump hard currency
from the weaker. 51
The military's cohesion was
further threatened by the politicization of
the commissioned officer corps resulting
from elections of many officers to
legislatures (Soviets) at various levels.52
The positions taken by military officers-
people's deputies testified to a
considerable political polarization within
the officer corps. Colonels Viktor
Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko became
the leaders of the reactionary Soyuz
group in the Congress of People's
Deputies. Major Vladimir Lopatin
became a prominent spokesman for
military reform for the democratic
5 W. Zhitarenko, "Zauryadnyy iuda," Krasnaya
zvezda, December 22, 1990; Radio Liberty Daily
Report, No. 245, January 4, 1991; Radio Liberty
Daily Report, No. 35, February 19, 1991; Radio
Liberty Daily Report, No. 191, October 8, 1990.
"For a detailed study of politicization of the
Soviet military, see Meyer,"How the Coup (and
the Threat) Collapsed," pp. 5-38.
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opposition. Many of today's junior and
middle ranking officers have become
opposed to the Marxist-Leninist political
orthodoxy. An analysis of the voting
patterns of military officers-members of
the RSFSR First Congress of People's
Deputies in 1990 showed that while
senior officers cast only 16 percent of
their votes for the reformist "Democratic
Russia" bloc, 82 percent of their votes
were cast against; "among the middle-
level ... officers the figure is 63 percent
(37 percent against), and among junior
officers — 73 percent (22 percent
against)."53 Despite the pressure of the
High Command to vote against Boris
Yeltsin in Russia's presidential election in
June 1991, he nonetheless came out a
winner in several electoral districts
comprising major military bases. 54
This radicalization, however, is
by no means uniform. Even junior
officers in the divisions returning from
Eastern Europe have been sympathetic to
anti-reformist ideas and personalities,
such as Colonel Alksnis. 55 This is
hardly surprising: these officers have
been suddenly uprooted from what used
to be the most desirable billets in the
Soviet Armed Forces, without being
exposed to the political ferment of the last
several years at home, and have been
moved to unprepared garrisons, mainly in
areas gripped by nationalist fervor. In
this turbulent political atmosphere, a
number of officers—People's Deputies
began to use their parliamentary immunity
to severely criticize the policies of reform.
Use of the military for police
operations began to weaken the discipline
even prior to the August coup. Vice
Admiral Belov, Commander of the
Tallinn naval base, was critical of the
actions of the military in Vilnius, in
January 1991, and vowed no similar
action in Estonia.56 Several officers from
the Vitebsk paratroop division said in an
interview with Lithuanian radio that they
would not shoot civilians if ordered.57 A
group of anonymous officers from the
Moscow Military District published a
protest against the use of the military to
intimidate Yeltsin's supporters in
Moscow on March 28, 1991. 58 The
actions of Soviet troops against
Armenians in Nagornyy Karabakh were
publicly decried by a group of junior
"Julia Wishnevsky. "The Two Sides of the
Barricades in Russian Politics Today," Report on
the USSR, August 24, 1990, p. 17.
54Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 113, June
17, 1991.
55N. Andreev, V. Litovkin, "Tri pis'ma iz
armii," Izvestiya, February 13, 14, 15, 1991:
also see N. Andreev, "Ofitserskiy korpus,"
Izvestiya, April 4, 1991.
56"Vitse-Admiral Belov: Ofitsery Tallinnskogo
garnizona protiv primeneniya voennoy sily,"
Informatsionnoe Agenstvo Novosti, January 30,
1991.
57Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 14, January
21, 1991.
5 °"Russkie soldaty! Russkie ofitsery!"
Svobodnoe slovo, April 16, 1991.
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officers stationed there.59 The military's
ability to mobilize the reserves for police
duty was weakened. The call-up of
reservists for an operation in Baku,
Azerbaijan in January 1990, was
successfully resisted in some areas. 60 In
1991, the USSR Ministry of Defense had
to agree to the demands of Uzbekistan
that Uzbek conscripts could be sent to
troubled area of Transcaucasia only on a
voluntary contract basis. 61
The cohesion of the high
command was shaken by debates over
one of the most controversial issues of
military reform—replacing conscripts with
volunteers. The services which require
skilled personnel and are relatively small
in size—the Navy, the Strategic Rocket
Forces, the Air Force and the Air Defense
Forces—have stated their preference for
volunteers over conscripts, and the Navy
has begun experimenting with contracting
enlisted men. The huge Ground Forces,
on the contrary, have shown no interest
in volunteers, most probably because
their skill requirements are generally
lower, and their size makes reliance on
volunteers unrealistic, with the notable
exception of the relatively small and elite
59"My, russkie ofitsery, zayavlyaem: eto
genotsid!" Epokha, No. 21 (June 1991).
"0"Zadachi u nas odni," Krasnaya zvezda,
February 10, 1990.
"*L. Savel'yev, "Prizyv-po soglasheniyu,
sluzhba-po prisyage," Pravda vostoka, May 15,
1991.
Airborne Forces. 62 At the same time,
until the August coup, there had been no
visible significant breakdowns of the
military chain of command or mass
disobedience in the armed forces. Even
the unpopular and hastily prepared troop
withdrawal from Eastern Europe was
implemented strictly according to
schedule.
^^Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Soviet Navy
Become a Volunteer Force?" Report on the
USSR, Vol. 2, No. 5 (February 2, 1990), pp. 5-
7; V. Volgin, "Na flot-po kontraktu," Trud, May
17, 1991; O. Vladykin, "Voennaya reforma:
realii i perspektivy," Krasnaya zvezda. June 12,
1991; Maj. Gen. Geliy Batenin, "Kak preodolet'
sindrom 41 -go," Novoe vremya, No. 8 (February
1991); Maj. Gen. V.G. Strekozov, "Zakony ob
oborone i statuse voennosluzhshchikh-pravovaya
osnovoa sotsial'noy politiki sovetskogo
gosudarstva v vooruzhennykh silakh," Voennaya
MysV, January 1991, pp. 5-13; "Kto yest' kto,"
Central TV, March 20, 1991, (Interview with
Gen. Yazov); Col. Gen. Aleksey Mironov,
"Naemnyy ryadovoy: 'za' i 'protiv'," Moskovskie
novosti, January 28, 1990; Col Gen G.
Krivosheev, "Voinskaya sluzhba: ravenstvo pered
zakonom," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No.
4 (February 1990), pp. 18-24; V. Moroz,
"Proshu zachislit' riadovym...," Krasnaya zvezda,
April 3,1990; A. Antoshkin, "Naemnaya armiya:
dorozhe ili deshevle?" Kommunist
vooruzhennykh sil, No. 9 (May 1990), pp. 38-
43; E. Lunev, "V armiiu... po kontraktu,"
Sovetskaia kul'tura, April 7, 1990; "Vremya
vozrastayushchey otvetstvennosti," Krasnaya
zvezda, May 18, 1990; V. Serebryannikov,
"Kakaya armiya nam nuzhna," Kommunist
vooruzhennykh sil, No. 9 (May 1990), pp. 34-
38; Col. N. Karasev, "Skol'ko stoit
professional?" Morskoy sbornik, June 1990, pp.
8-12; N. Burbyga, "V desantniki-po kontraktu?"
Izvestiya, July 23, 1990.
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Gorbachev as Commander-in-Chief
To understand the real state of the
centralization of the Soviet military prior
to the August coup, one must consider a
"weak link," that appeared in the all
important nexus between the military
High Command and the top civilian
policy-maker — President of the USSR,
General Secretary of the CPSU,
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Armed Forces and Colonel of the
Reserves, Mikhail Sergeyevich
Gorbachev. Leaving aside the military's
discontent over many of his actions or
inactions (to be discussed later),
Gorbachev appears to have simply paid
little attention to the military. Between
March 1985 and August 1990,
Gorbachev had only two publicized
exposures to the military during his visits
to the Pacific and Northern Fleets in July,
1986 and September 1987, respectively,
as well as an unpublicized meeting with
top military officers in July of 1985. 63
Gorbachev was demonstratively
disengaged from the military at a time
when the Soviet Armed Forces were
receiving one jolt after another, including:
o:)
"Nagrada rodiny - na znameni goroda,"
Izvestiya, July 29, 1986; "Na zemle zapolyar'ya,"
Pravda, October 1, 1987; Harry Gelman,
"Gorbachev and the Future of Ihe Soviet Military
Institution," Adelphi Papers, No. 258. (The
International Institute for Strategic Studies),
Spring 1991, p. 13.
deteriorating living conditions,
unprecedented negative publicity, the
withdrawal from Afghanistan, unilateral
personnel cuts and major reductions of
nuclear and conventional weapons, the
loss of Eastern Europe, and the
increasing use of the military to police the
disintegrating empire.64 In 1990 several
senior and middle-ranking officers-
People's Deputies attacked Gorbachev's
reforms in a most vitriolic fashion.
Colonel General Al'bert Makashov, for
instance, referred to proponents of the
"new thinking" in foreign policy as
"learned turkeys," and implied that a
military coup might solve the country's
problems. 65 Gorbachev did not punish
Makashov, just as he left unpunished
other similar attacks, the sharpest of them
against Eduard Shevardnadze, which
contributed to his decision to resign from
the post of Foreign Minister in December
1990. 66
64 This policy of not-so-benign neglect was
rather typical of Gorbachev's management style
when it came to institutions whose influence he
found excessive. For instance, in 1988
Gorbachev practically stopped the work of the
Secretariat of the Central Committee of the
CPSU, thus disabling the transmission belts
connecting the top communist party leaders with
the party bodies throughout the USSR. [See
Materialy plenuma tsentral'novo komiteta KPSS,
25 aprelya 1989 goda (Moscow: Politizdat,
1989), pp. 65, 92-93.]
"^Col.Gen. A. Makashov, "My ne sobirayemsya
sdavat'sya," Krasnaya zvezda, June 21, 1990.
66col. Gen. I. Rodionov, "Kogda perestanut
glumit'sya nad armiyey i derzhavoy?" Molodaya
gvardiya, September 1990, p. 7; "'Ne mozhem
otnesti eto k dostizheniyam nashey vneshney
politiki'," Literaturnaya Rossiya, November 12,
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Gorbachev finally addressed the
military on the situation in the country
and on the conditions of the armed forces
only on August 17, 1990. 67 In this
speech, Gorbachev defended the whole
range of his policies, as well as the need
for military reform, but avoided stating
his own views on the crucial issues of
military reform. On September 9, 1990,
Gorbachev issued a presidential order to
improve the social conditions of the
military: it addressed some important
procedural issues of military justice, and
decreed compulsory life and disability
insurance for servicemen, but failed to
address the critical issues of housing and
food. 68
The crucial meeting between
Gorbachev and military officers-
People's Deputies on November 13,
1990 was a direct reaction not only to the
growing discontent and anti-reform mood
among the military, but also to the
challenge to the existing chain of
command presented by Boris Yeltsin,
then Chairman of the Russian
1990; Maj. Aleksey Vashchenko, "Persidskiy
zaliv-eto ryadom," Literaturnaya Rossiya,
November 30, 1990; Radio Liberty Daily
Report, No. 241, December 20, 1990; Radio
Liberty Daily Report, No. 242, December 21,
1990.
"7
"Rech' M. Gorbacheva pered ofitserami,"
Central TV, August 17, 1991, reproduced in
USSR Today. Soviet Media News and Features
Digest, August 17, 1990, pp. 1-16.
68"0 nekotorykh merakh po usileniyu
sotsial'noy i pravovoy zashchity
voennosluzhashchikh," Krasnaya zvezda,
September 6, 1990.
Federation's Supreme Soviet. The
RSFSR government protested the
October 24, 1990 nuclear test at the
Novaya Zemlya test range, demanding
that the USSR government respect
Russia's sovereignty and consult with
Russia's government on issues of
"defense and security." 69 On November
2, 1990, RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan
Silaev met with military officers-RSFSR
People's Deputies. Silaev promised that
the Russian government would act to
improve the living conditions of the
military, and was reported to have offered
additional food rations to officers.70
According to one report, the issue of
establishing the Russian national guard
was tentatively raised by Yeltsin's
personal representative, Gennadiy
Burbulis. 71 In the face of the continuing
failure of the USSR government to
reverse or even stem the decline of
officers' living standards, Yeltsin bid for
the loyalty of the armed forces.
Already on November 4, Minister
of Defense Yazov met with the same
group of officers and promised a meeting
with Gorbachev to discuss their
69"Zayavlenie Prezidiuma Verkhovonogo Soveta
RSFSR i Soveta ministrov RSFSR," Rossiya,
No.l (1990).
7
^V. Urban, "Korr jshat' problemy armii?"
Krasnaya zvezda, No\ ember 4, 1990; "Armiyu ne
otdelit' ot naroda," Krasnaya zvezda, November
15, 1990.
^Larisa Zakharova, "Nuzhna li prezidentu
armiya?" Literator, No. 44 (1990).
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complaints on November 13. 72 The nine
days in between were apparently
necessary to pack the meeting with
conservative officers-- People's Deputies
from the USSR as a whole. 73 The
November 13 meeting did nothing to
reassert Gorbachev's authority over the
military. Most speakers were highly
critical ofperestroika and glasnost', while
Gorbachev sounded defensive. To
underscore his low prestige among the
military, the Defense Ministry's daily
published Gorbachev's speech after the
transcript of angry complaints by
officers, contrary to the established
tradition. 74 On the next day, Colonel
Viktor Alksnis, a spokesman for Soyuz,
the anti-reformist group of People's
Deputies, said that Gorbachev "lost" the
armed forces at that the meeting. 75 On
November 16, 1990 Gorbachev signed a
decree raising the salaries of all officers in
command positions, from platoon to
corps, by 45.7 to 34 per cent
respectively.76 This action, undertaken
as it was only in response to the pressure
of angry officers and Yeltsin's challenge,
could hardly enhance Gorbachev's
prestige with the military.
ILV. Urban, "Rasschityvaem na pomoshch'
sovetov," Krasnaya zvezda, November 4, 1990.
73 Zakharova, "Nuzhna li prezidentu armiya?"
74
"Armiyu ne otdelit' ot naroda," Krasnaya
zvezda, November 15, 1990.
75Moscow TV-1, November 14, 1990.
76Interview with Marshal D. Yazov, Central TV,
November 25, 1990.
The Struggle for the Military's Loyalty
The period of January through
August 1991 saw a battle for the
military's loyalty between Boris Yeltsin
and his supporters in the RSFSR
government, on one hand, and on the
other, an increasingly isolated Gorbachev
in an uneasy and uneven alliance with the
conservatives in the Central Committee of
the USSR Communist Party, the RSFSR
Communist Party, and the USSR
government. The year 1990 ended with
the frantic public activity of Colonel
Alksnis, the spokesman for the Soyuz
alliance of conservative members of the
USSR Congress of People's Deputies.
In a series of interviews, he assailed the
reforms that had led to the Soviet
accommodation with the West and to the
disintegration of the Soviet empire, and
promised that in 1991 the military would
play a decisive political role-if they were
saved from a split. 77
77Tatyana Kolgushkina, "Alksnis mog by
skazat' bol'she," Sovetskaya molodezh',
December 1, 1990; V. Urban, "O pol'ze sporov s
prezidentom...," Krasnaya zvezda, December 8,
1990; "Armiya i politiki," Literaturnaya
Rossiya, December 14, 1990; D. Tabachnik,
"Taynaya vecherya' s uchastiem TsRU?"
Komsomol'skoe znamya, December 16, 1990;
"Soyuz sokhranen budet," Krasnaya zvezda,
December 31, 1990; A. Riskin, "Viktor Alksnis:
'Soyuznyy dogovor-eto blef," Yedinstvo,
December 31, 1990.
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In early January of 1991, a
weekly magazine of the Ministry of
Defense published an article by Boris
Yeltsin, entitled The Military Are Our
Children. 1* The fact that this mouthpiece
of military conservatives published
Yeltsin was important in itself: it meant
that Yeltsin had some support among the
High Command. In his article, Yeltsin
continued to court the military by
promising to improve the living
conditions of the officer corps. His goal
apparently was to warn the military,
without offending them, against
intervention in politics on the
conservative side. Yeltsin reassured his
readers that the military should play an
important role in a state with Russia's
martial traditions, and that it was
legitimate for servicemen to be members
of legislatures. Both of these ideas were
at odds with the stridently anti-military
mood then prevalent in the democratic
movement. At the same time, Yeltsin
said that a military coup would aggravate
economic, social and political crises, and
that only a small group of "adventurers"
within the military could attempt it. The
Soviet Armed Forces, he continued,
might split up as a result of a coup, and a
civil war, possibly involving nuclear
weapons, might ensue. Then Yeltsin
7°B. N. Yeltsin, "Armiya--eto nashi deli," Syn
otechestva,No. 1 (January 1991).
shifted back to his courtship of the officer
corps: the military, he said, is not a
dark, reactionary force ... the
healthy forces in the military
would not allow it to take the
path of destruction. The
guarantee of this is the officer
corps of Russia, which has
always kept immortal the
loftiest moral values: honor,
glory, courage, valor, loyalty
to the people and to the
Fatherland.79
The massacre of Lithuanians in
Vilnius on January 13 marked a new
round of fighting for the military's
loyalty. Gorbachev's lame explanations
and his denial of any knowledge of plans
for the crackdown, coupled with his
refusal to condemn it outright, could only
further damage his standing as
commander-in-chief: he appeared to be
either not in control of the military, or to
be shifting the blame on them. 80 Indeed,
Colonel Alksnis accused Gorbachev of
being behind the crackdown, losing his
nerve once blood was shed, and making
the armed forces a scapegoat. 81 Yeltsin's
response, in contrast, was direct, forceful
and statesmanlike. He condemned the
violence in Lithuania, and appealed to
Russian servicemen not to take part in
attacks against civilians, pointing out that
79ibid.
^Moscow Radio 1, January 14, 1991.
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 15, January
22, 1991; V. Romanenko, "Polkovnik Alksnis:
'Moskva nas brosila'," Argumenty i fakty. No. 4
(February 1991).
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the use of servicemen from the RSFSR in
police operations outside of the Russian
republic contravened RSFSR laws. 82
Yeltsin announced that he would proceed
to establish an RSFSR Committee on
State Security (in order to eventually
control the KGB and the military on
Russia's territory), and that he believed
that a Russian army should be created. 83
On January 18, Yeltsin met with
members of the military trade union
Shchit (Shield), an organization of retired
and anonymous active duty officers close
to democratic politics and highly
unpopular with the Ministry of Defense.
Reportedly they discussed the defense of
Russia's government against a hard-
liners' armed attack, and the possibility of
establishing a Russian army. 84 On
January 31 Yeltsin established the
RSFSR State Committee for Defense and
Security, and appointed Colonel General
Konstantin Kobets, Chief of
Communications of the USSR Armed
Forces and Deputy Chief of General
Staff, as the Committee's chairman. 85
Kobets was not forced to resign his
commission in the Soviet Armed Forces
in order to take on his new job, probably
82B. Yeltsin, "Soldaty, serzhanty i ofitsery...,"
Atmoda, January 15, 1991.
°^Leon Aron, "Moscow Diary: January 12-17,
1991," Global Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring
1991), p. 49.
°4Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 15, January
22, 1991.
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 23, February
1, 1991.
an indication that the High Command did
not want to sever all relations with
Yeltsin.
The impact of these events on
middle-ranking and junior officers
yielded a further decline of Gorbachev's
prestige, as well as some positive
responses to Yeltsin's calls for a Russian
army, despite top-ranking officers' harsh
criticism of the idea.86 As for the high-
ranking officers, General Kobets
complained of a largely negative reaction
among them to his acceptance of the new
appointment. 87 A spectacular
manifestation of Yeltsin's growing
popularity among the officer corps was
the support given to him by Colonel
Aleksandr Rutskoi, a pilot highly
decorated for his service during the war
in Afghanistan, a member of the RSFSR
Supreme Soviet, and former member of
the ultraconservative Russian nationalist
organization Otechestvo (Fatherland).
Rutskoi denounced the violence in
Lithuania, as well as Gorbachev's
dishonesty in the matter, and said that
°"Yuriy Teplyakov, "Kto zhe ubil?" Moskovskie
novosti, January 27, 1991; Marshal of the Soviet
Union S. Akhromeev, "Byt' ili ne byt' Soyuzu?"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, February 7, 1991;
"Politicheskie ambitsii i sud'ba Otechestva,"
Krasnaya Zvezda, January 18, 1991; Maj. Gen.
V. G. Strekozov, "Zakony ob oborone i statuse
voennosluzhshchikh--pravovaya osnovoa
sotsial'noy politiki sovetskogo gosudarstva v
vooruzhennykh silakh," Voennaya mysl'. No. 1
(January 1991), p. 9.
°'A. Krayniy, "Samoe interesnoe nachalos',
kogda ya vyklyuchil diktofon,"
Komsomosl'skaya pravda, March 26, 1991.
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Russia's mission was to stop the
bloodshed.88
On March 28, 1991, Gorbachev
ordered tens of thousands of troops into
Moscow's streets to prevent a mass
demonstration in support of Yeltsin. The
intimidation, however, failed.
Gorbachev began to change his political
course back to one of accommodation
with Russia's leader, culminating in the
signing, on April 23, of the Nine plus
One agreement between Gorbachev and
nine union republics.89 Even before that,
the Soviet president attempted to balance
his policy of control over the armed
forces through accommodation of the
conservative elements in the High
Command. In his April 7 address to a
conference of Soviet Armed Forces
Communists, Gorbachev for the first time
criticized General Makashov for his
attacks against reforms, and warned the
military against interfering in politics.
Still, Gorbachev found it necessary to
support such positions of the
conservative military officers as
continuing control by the Communist
party of the armed forces, and the
preservation of centralized Union
88Radio Rossiya, January 21, 1991; Douglas
Smith, "Moscow's 'Otechestvo': A Link
Between Russian Nationalism and Conservative
Opposition to Reform," Report on the USSR,
July 28, 1989, pp. 6-9.
°9"Sovmestnoe zayavlenie o bezotlagalel'nykh
merakh po stabilizatsii obstanovki v strane i
preodolenii krizisa," Pravda, April 24, 1991.
government structures.90 This could not
strengthen Gorbachev's position vis-a-vis
the military: he was trapped between the
legacy of his neglect of the officer corps,
and his record of political zigzags
between reform and reaction, never
decisively committing himself to any
course of action. The conference
reaffirmed the Communist party's
domination of the armed forces.91 This,
in effect, meant Gorbachev's failure to
strengthen his control over the armed
forces because (according to his senior
advisor, Aleksandr Yakovlev) his control
over the Communist party itself was
marginal by the summer of 1991.92
The RSFSR presidential
campaign in May-June 1991 marked a
new stage in the leading politicians'
courtship of the military and the military's
involvement in politics. Former Prime
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, the
conservative candidate, selected as his
vice-presidential running mate Colonel
General Boris Gromov, the last
commander of the Soviet forces in
Afghanistan, who had assumed a high
profile in Soviet public life. Boris Yeltsin
selected Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoi as his
running mate. 93 General Makashov,
90Cemral TV, April 7, 1991.
9 1Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 67, April 8,
1991.
'^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 156, August
19, 1991.
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 95, May 21,
1991. On Gen. Gromov, see M. Khondoshko,
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endorsed by a Stalinist communist group
and by several military units, also became
a presidential candidate, running on a
platform of reversing Gorbachev's
reforms.94
In the course of his campaign for
the presidency of the RSFSR, Yeltsin
stepped back from his call for a Russian
army, a demand that apparently disturbed
many officers.95 On the last day of his
presidential campaign, Yeltsin again
cautioned Gorbachev against using the
armed forces against civilians in Russia, a
view apparently shared by many in the
officer corps.96 Yeltsin visited a major
naval base at Severomorsk and promised
to improve officers' housing conditions
there.97 In the election, Yeltsin's ticket
"Miting v Kieve," Krasnaya Zvezda, September
17, 1989; Nikolai Bulavintsev, "Pravda vyshe
sensatsii," Sovetskaiya Rossiya, November 15,
1989; B.V. Gromov, "Zashchishchali, obuchali,
stroili," Voenno-istohcheskiy zhurnal, March
1989, pp. 11-15; Col Gen B. Gromov,
"Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily. Novoe
kachestvo," Pod znamenem leninizma. No. 2
(1990), pp. 32-36; V. Dolganov. "Polkovnik
Vilen Martirosyan: 'Voennyy perevorot
vozmozhen'," Komsomol'skaya znamya,
September 28, 1990; Col. Gen. Boris Gromov,
"Ne nuzhno nagnetat' strasti," Moskovskie
novosti, October 14, 1990; Aleksandr Putko,
"Gromov dolzhen stat' ministrom vmesto
Yazova," Nezavisimaya gazela, June 8, 1991;
Col. Gen. Gromov, "Priznayu lish* diktaturu
zakona," Situatsiya, No. 7 (1991).
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 92. May 15,
1991.
95Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 108, June
10, 1991.
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 109, June
11, 1991.
^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 105, June 5.
1991.
gained 60 percent of the vote, Ryzhkov
and Gromov gained only 16 percent, and
Makashov finished together with several
other minor candidates. Makashov failed
to get the majority of the votes even in his
home base, reportedly receiving 43% of
the vote "'in his own constituency
(presumably the Volga-Ural Military
District), including 95% in the
construction battalions, but only between
24 percent and 35 percent" in a military
academy located there.98 The presence of
a military officer on the ticket did not
make much difference regarding voter
appeal, and Makashov's, the only ticket
led by a military officer, did miserably.
Rutskoi and Gromov were apparently
needed to strengthen the respective
presidential candidates relations with the
armed forces.
After his election as Russia's
president, Yeltsin said that Gorbachev
should consult with him on military
issues. 99 Gorbachev, possibly aware of
his inability to control the Communist
party and the armed forces through it,
ordered on June 22 that military councils,
which oversee military activities in
military districts, include chairmen of
local legislatures (Soviets) instead of local
Communist party leaders, and become
subordinated directly to the USSR
President, rather than to the Central




Committee of the CPSU. 100 (The
replacement of party officials by
legislative leaders in military councils had
been advocated since the beginning of
1991 by politicians close to Yeltsin.) 101
Never to be outdone by Gorbachev,
Yeltsin issued on July 20 (eight days after
his inauguration as Russia's president) an
edict banning Communist party cells from
all "places of work," including the
military, on RSFSR territory. 102 General
Mikhail Surkov, chief of the armed
forces' CPSU organization, refused to
implement Yeltsin's order on the grounds
that the military were subordinate only to
all-Union authorities. 103 Nevertheless,
some military units began to dismantle
their Communist party organizations
without waiting for orders. 104
By August 1991, the Russian
government seriously challenged the
Union government's command of the
armed forces. One might say that the
military began a transfer of their loyalty
from the USSR to Russia. This was part
of the process of formation of a new
l^Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 1 19, June
25, 1991, and No. 123, July 1, 1991. Also see
Stephen Foye, "Gorbachev's Return to Reform:
What Does It Mean for the Armed Forces?"
Report on the USSR, July 12, 1991, p. 8.
*01"Rossiya, armiya, reforma," Rossiya, No. 6
(1991).
l02Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 137, July
22, 1991; and No. 147, August 5, 1991.
103Radio Liberty Daily Report ,No. 148,
August 6, 1991.
104Radio Liberty Daily Report, No. 150,
August 8, 1991; and No. 152, August 12, 1991.
Russian state, based on a new Russian
nationalism, which appeared to reject the
imperial heritage.
The centralization of the military
was shattered in the process of the
August coup and fell apart after the
dissolution of the USSR. Ukraine's
decision to form its own armed forces,
and her success in attracting the loyalty of
many servicemen, have driven the last
nail into the coffin of the USSR armed
forces. The process of decentralization
can be stopped only when Russia makes
the inevitable step of formally claiming
the bulk of the former Soviet military.
The Russian government has already
transferred to its "jurisdiction" all the
former Soviet forces deployed outside the
CIS (in the Baltic states, Georgia,
Germany, Poland, Mongolia, and
Cuba). 105 The Russian Ministry of
Defense was established on March 16,
1992, and President Yeltsin became
acting Minister of Defense (another
indication of the political importance of
the military). 106 A purely Russian
military will be ethnically much more
cohesive than its Soviet predecessor, and,
unlike the CIS forces, will clearly owe
their allegiance to one government-that
of Russia.
l05RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 47, March 9,
1992; Army General K. Kobets, "Prioritety
voennoy politiki Rossii, Nezavisimaya gazeta,
February 5, 1992.




however, will still likely suffer from
several decentralizing tendencies. The
differences between the more radical
junior and middle-ranking officers, on the
one hand, and the conservative senior
officers, on the other, will remain. The
officer corps now tends to challenge the
formal chain of command, as
demonstrated by the creation of the
permanently operating Coordinating
Committee of the Officers' Assembly,
tasked with defending the interests of the
armed forces. Centralization will also be
threatened whenever the interests of
Russian foreign policy collide with the
interests of a large enough group of
officers, as exemplified by the growing
resistance of former Soviet forces to a
withdrawal from the Baltic states. There
officers of two paratroop divisions have
threatened to take "all measures necessary
... including the use of our professional
capacities," if the terms of withdrawal are
not to their liking. 107
Public Perception of the Military
One measure of the military's
potential political influence is how it is
perceived by the public. The Soviet
military was viewed very positively by
107RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 14. January 22,
1992, No. 10, January 16, 1992.
large segments of the public at the end of
World War II and for some time
afterwards. The nearly miraculous
character of the victory over Nazi
Germany born out of the depths of
defeat, has contributed to a great
popularity of the military. One may
assume that much of this psychological
capital was squandered during
Brezhnev's regime: twenty years of
force-fed "military-patriotic upbringing,"
as well as the absurd and massive
campaign to give legitimacy to
Brezhnev's rule by turning him, thirty
years after victory, into a war hero, must
have left the public anesthetized to the talk
about military heroics.
The defeat in Afghanistan was
certainly a blow to the "heroic" image of
the Soviet Armed Forces. Especially
painful has been the stream of revelations
about brutalities committed in
Afghanistan both against enemy fighters
and civilians and Soviet troops
themselves. The affair of the German
youth Matthias Rust, who penetrated
Soviet air space and landed his Cessna
aircraft near the Kremlin, demonstrated
the military's deficiency as the nation's
defender. The virtuous image of the
military has been damaged by numerous
revelations about the privileges enjoyed
by the senior officers. 108 Military
1 08 viadimir Sergeev, "Dachnye privilegii pri
svete glasnosti," Ogonyok, No. 13 (March
1990), pp. 17- 19; Aleksandr Putko, "Gromov
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officers are often viewed as just another
variety of the bureaucratic fat cats; a
writer for the Defense Ministry daily
sadly recounts a conversation between
two women, overheard at a military
cemetery:
What a nice cemetery, said one
... Yes, said the other, the
military always grab the best
for themselves. *^9
Most of all, the cause to which military
service was dedicated, the Communist
empire, has been made to look hollow at
best and evil at worst.
Nevertheless, despite these
obvious image problems, the Soviet
military consistently remains one of the
most popular institutions in the USSR.
According to an opinion poll in July
1990, support for the military was 35 per
cent ( down from 44 per cent in
December, 1989), which still left it with a
bit less public confidence than the
Republican Supreme Soviets (40 per
cent) and churches (36 per cent), but
better off than the mass media (34 per
cent), the USSR Council of Ministers (20
per cent), the KGB (24 per cent), and the
CPSU (14 per cent). As the systemic
crisis deepened in 1991, the popularity of
dolzhen stat' ministrom vmeslo Yazova,"
Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 8, 1991; Petr
Shevchenko, "Tma privilegiy," Komsomolskaya
znamya, May 28, 1991.
10"Col. A. Khorev, "Ekho zlosloviya,"
Krasnaya zvezda, December 12, 1987.
the military apparently increased: a public
opinion poll published a week before the
August coup stated that the military's 50
per cent approval rating was second only
to that of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Obviously, the January 13, 1991
massacre in Vilnius did not hurt the
standing of the armed forces. Indeed,
officer schools were more popular among
young people in 1991 than in several
previous years. 110
This does not mean that
substantial segments of the public agreed
with the conservative politics of the pre-
coup military high command. In a
summer 1990 poll, 40 per cent described
the positions of top military officers as
"conservative" and "backward." At the
same time, a substantial minority of 38
per cent believed that only a small number
of servicemen had such "backward"
political views. 111 One tends to agree
with the Soviet pollster that the general
public there simply did not identify the
military with its command. The senior
officers, because of the privileges they
enjoy, were viewed as part of the hated
Communist nomenklatura. The rest of
1
^A. Khokhlov, "...a Ryazan' - gorod
leitenantov," Komsomol'skaya pravda, August 2,
1991.
in Aleksei Levinson, "KPSS, KGB i armiya
teryayut samykh vernykh storonnikov," Novoe
vremya. No. 47 (November 1990); Yuriy Levada,
Aleksei Levinson, "Chto mozhet otnyat' u
obshchestva 'chelovek s ruzhyem'?" Moskovskie
novosii, September 9, 1990; Radio Liberty Daily
Report, No. 152, August 12, 1991.
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the military then were regarded as victims
of the "system," not responsible for the
words and actions of their command, just
as the Soviet populace did not consider
itself responsible for the actions of the
communist leadership. Thus, the
popularity of the military did not
automatically translate into the public's
approval of any actions ordered by its
high command.
The August 1991 coup must have
confirmed this public perception of the
military. High-ranking generals, true to
their image, were ready to use the armed
forces to defend the interests of the
nomenklatura. Middle-ranking and junior
officers, as well as enlisted men, emerged
from the crisis with the reputation of a
"people's army" unwilling to shoot
unarmed civilians, generally confirmed in
the public's mind. Indeed, according to
public opinion polls, thirty percent of
Russia's urban dwellers came to view the
military more positively after the August
coup, and only 12 percent came to view it
more negatively. 112
The Problem of Legitimacy
Popularity of the military does not
automatically translate into the legitimacy
of military rule: the percentage of those
112
"U pobedy mnogo roditeley. porazhenie--
vsegda sirota," Komsomol'skaya pravda,
September 25, 1991.
expressing confidence in the military
(between 35 and 50 per cent in various
polls, as indicated earlier) is substantially
higher than the 22 percent of those
favoring a military coup at the end of
] 990 113 a government not possessing
authority (i.e., where people do not
recognize its legitimacy) will have to rule
by force, a prospect obviously not
relished by the August plotters, whose
resolve crumbled in the face of rather
modest resistance.
The military's uncertainty about
its independent political role, and about
the public's readiness to accept such a
role, has been visible even through the
numerous angry political pronouncements
made by high ranking military officers.
In January 1991, Defense Minister Yazov
said that military intervention in politics
was likely, but only on order from the
civilian authorities. 114 The most
prominent military officers, such as
Yazov, the late Marshal Sergei
Akhromeev, and the last commander of
^^Yuriy Levada, "Takoy dlinnyy god,"
Moskovskie novosti, January 6, 1991. A recent
Gallup poll in the United States has found the
popular confidence in the military to be 68
percent, the highest for all national institutions.
It was quite above that of organized religion (56
percent), much higher than the rating of the
President (50 percent), much higher than the
rating of the Supreme Court (39 percent), and
overwhelmingly higher than that of the U.S.
Congress, (18 percent) (San Francisco Chronicle,
October 16, 1991). But nobody expects a
military coup in the United States.
114
"Armiya, vidimo, budet vmeshivat'sya v
politiku," Nasha gazeta, January 1, 1991.
26
Soviet forces in Afghanistan, General
Boris Gromov, denied on several
occasions that the military could even
contemplate a coup d'etat. 115
High-ranking military officers
signed protests against reform invariably
in the company of civilians. This was the
case, for instance, with the Word to the
People, a very transparent call for a
reversal of reforms, published shortly
before the August coup. It was not only
signed by General Valentin Varennikov,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground
Forces, and General Gromov, but also by
a number of non-military public
figures. 116 Only when specifically
military issues were involved, did high-
ranking military officers band together
without a civilian "cover," for instance, to
protest Boris Yeltsin's call in the
aftermath of the January 1991 massacre
in Vilnius, to establish a Russian national
guard. 117
There is no trace of a "manifest
destiny," which might legitimize political
intervention in the eyes of a military
"5y. Ostrovskiy, "Dmitriy Yazov: Glasnost'
ukreplyaet bezopasnosnt'," Moskovskie novosti,
No. 29, July 16, 1989; S. Akhromecv, "Kakie
vooruzhennye sily nuzhny Sovetskomu Soiuzu,"
Ogonyok, (December 1989); N. Velan, "Lish' by
poshumet'...," Sovetskaya Rossiya, September
29, 1990; Col. Gen. Boris Gromov, "Ne nuzhno
nagnetat' strasti," Moskovskie novosti, October
14, 1990.
^""Slovo k narodu," Sovetskaya Rossiya, July
23, 1991.
117
"Politicheskie ambitsii i sud'ba Otcchcstva,"
Krasnaya zvezda, January 18, 1991.
establishment, in the Soviet and Russian
military tradition. Neither the
monarchy's claim of the divine origins of
its power, nor the CPSU's messianic
claims would allow the military to
develop a sense of manifest destiny.
Some intellectuals in the conservative
coalition, such as the writers Prokhanov
and Karem Rash, have been trying to
foster the sense of manifest destiny
among the military. Prokhanov called
upon the military to save civilization
amidst impending chaos in the Soviet
Union. 118 Rash, who has become a
popular figure among the conservative
military circles, has created a manifest
destiny myth out of the hugely overblown
figure of World War II, Deputy Supreme
Commander-in-Chief Marshal Georgiy
Zhukov, and proposed the military as the
new elite for the Soviet Union instead of
the Communist party. 119 There have
been no indications, however, that such
pronouncements have had any significant
impact so far on the demoraliz J militarv
establishment. Appeals to save the
derzhava (approximately translated as a
"great state") mostly have come from
**°A. Prokhanov, "Dostatochnaya oborona,"
Literaturnaya Rossiya, April 6. 1990.
^Karem Rash, "Armiya i kul'tura," Voenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 8 (August 1989), pp.
6, 7. On Rash, see Holloway, "State, Society
and the Military under Gorbachev," pp. 22, 23;
and Mikhail Tsypkin, "Karem Rash: An
Ideologue of Military Power," Report on the
USSR, Vol. 2, No. 31 (August 3, 1990), pp. 8-
11.
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generals, while average officers have
preferred to complain bitterly about then-
living conditions.
Prokhanov, one of the most
politically astute spokesmen for the
coalition of Russian Communist party
functionaries, defense industry
executives, anti-reform military officers
and conservative intellectuals, has
understood that the military's intervention
into politics would fail without a political
movement legitimizing it. In the spring
of 1990 he called for the creation of a
political party representing the interests of
the military. 120 What could be the
platform of such a political party?
Russian Hyper-Nationalism
Hyper-nationalism is "the belief
that other nations or nation-states are both
inferior and threatening and must
therefore be dealt with harshly." 121
Russian hyper-nationalism has been a
tool of the Kremlin since the end of
World War II. It was used openly by
Stalin during his last years, during the
campaign for Russian "priority" in all
12
^Prokhanov, "Dostatochnaya oborona."
l^John j Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future.
Instability in Europe after the Cold War,"
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer
1990), p. 21. For a recent discussion of the
impact of hyper-nationalism on European
security, also see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed
for Peace," International Security, Vol. 15, No.
3, (Winter 1990/91), pp. 23, 24.
fields of human endeavor. 122 In the
1960's and 1970's it was concealed
under the "internationalist" phraseology
of anti-Western propaganda. With
glasnost', Russian hyper-nationalism has
emerged as a political movement in its
own right, promoting the ideas of
Russian spiritual superiority to the West,
of the Russian natural right to lead the
Soviet empire, of the Russians'
victimization by non-Russians, etc. 123
Russian hyper-nationalism could
produce a political movement which
could then legitimize military intervention
into politics to stop the process of reform.
Indeed, for several years, persistent
efforts have been made to link the
conservative minded officers with
Russian hyper-nationalists. The two
share a number of views: both glorify the
Soviet/Russian military tradition and view
military service as indispensable for
forming the personalities of young men;
both distrust the West; both oppose the
dissolution of the Soviet empire and the
introduction of democracy and a market
economy.
^Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich,
Utopia in Power. The History of the Soviet
Union from 1917 to the Present (New York:
Summit Books, 1986), pp. 490-492.
J^Mjfchail Antonov, "Kak nam spasti i
vozrodit' Rossiyu," Golos rodiny, April 4, 1991;
Valentin Rasputin, "Intelligentsiya i patriotizm,"
Mosk\'a, February 1991, pp. 6-19; "Vse okazalis'
na pepelishche...," Slovo, February 1990
(Interview with Igor' Shafarevich); "Pis'mo
pisatelei Rossii," Literaturnaya Rossiya, March
20, 1990.
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Efforts to establish such an
alliance date back at least to 1988. At that
time some high-ranking military officers
began holding regular meetings with
conservative Russian intellectuals to
discuss issues of the "military-patriotic
upbringing" of young people. One such
gathering was held in March 1988,
symbolically in Volgograd (formerly
Stalingrad), and was attended by such
literary personalities as Anatoliy Ivanov,
the editor of the journal Molodaya
gvardiya, one of the most prominent anti-
reform periodicals, and by Stalinist
writers Ivan Stadnyuk and Felix Chuev.
Among the proposals put forward was
the establishment of a new "patriotic"
journal, Syn otechestva (The Son of
Fatherland). 124 The proposal was indeed
implemented, and Syn otechestva began
publishing in 1990 as a weekly magazine
of the Defense Ministry's daily, Krasnaya
zvezda, and became a mouthpiece for
Russian hyper-nationalists. 125
By August 1991, the military
press in general became one of the main
purveyors of Russian hyper-nationalistic
literature. The journal of the Main
Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed
Forces published a portrayal of Russia as
124"Ystrec |ia s pjsatelyami," Krasnaya zvezda,
March 12, 1988; "Vruchenie premiy ministerstva
oborony SSSR," Krasnaya zvezda, March 6,
1988; P. Tkachenko, "V poiskakh pravdivogo
slova," Krasnaya z\'ezda, April 8, 1988.
125$ee, for instance, Aleksandr Prokhanov,
"Armiya: mysli shtatskogo chcloveka." Syn
Otechestva," No. 27, (August 17, 1990).
the most abused nation of the USSR,
written by V. Fomichev, an author
regularly featured in Pul's Tushina, one
of the most rabid Russian chauvinist
periodicals. 126 The Defense Ministry's
Journal of Military History published
Tsarist secret police reports viciously
attacking Armenian nationalists. Other
examples are Karem Rash's paeans to the
exceptional virtues of the Russian officer,
Nina Andreeva's praise for the Red
Army's occupation of the three Baltic
states in 1940, 127 and an interview with
the leading Russian hyper-nationalist,
Stanislav Kunyaev, published by the
military daily, Red Star.m
The publications controlled by
Russian hyper-nationalists have opened
their pages to anti-reformist military
officers. Molodaya gvardiya (The Young
Guards), for instance, has published
several articles including: a vitriolic
attack against Andrei Sakharov by a
veteran of the war ; ; Afghanistan; an
angry denunciation of democracy by
126y Fomichev, "Rossiya: lyubov' i bol'
moya...," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh 5/7, No.
1 (January 1990), pp. 3-10; Vladimir Fomichev,
"Mysli sovpadaiut," Pul's Tushina, No. 3
(January 1990).
^'"Dashnaki," Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal,
No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 8-16, and No. 9
(September 1990), pp. 47-65; N.A. Andreeva,
"Istoricheskie prichudy," Voenno-istoricheskiy
zhurnal. No. 6 (June 1990), pp. 10-16; Karem
Rash, "Armiya i kul'tura," Voenno-istoricheskiy
zhurnal. No. 5 (May 1989), p. 4.
12 °V. Kazakov, "Sovremcnen li 'Nash
sovremennik'?" Krasnaya zvezda, December 20,
1989.
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Colonel General Igor Rodionov,
Commandant of the General Staff
Academy; and Marshal Akhromeev's
broadside against Boris Yeltsin. 129
Similar examples could be given for the
rest of the Russian hyper-nationalist
press. 130
Marshal Yazov's favorite
periodicals were Literatumaya Rossiya,
Nash sovremennik, and Den', all
published by Russian hyper-nationalists.
He forcefully promoted subscriptions to
these periodicals among officers, and
issued a special order (No. D-12) on July
7, 1991 to this effect. 131 The offices of
Den', whose editor is Prokhanov, were
installed, free of charge, in a building
owned by the Ministry of Defense, on the
^Sergey Chervonopiskiy, "Ne dadim v obidu
derzhavu," Molodaya gvardiya, November 1989.
pp. 130-134; Col. Gen. I. Rodionov, "Kogda
perestanut glumit'sya nad armiyey i derzhavoy?"
Molodaya gvardiya, September 1990, pp. 3-10;
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeev,
"Vooruzhennye sily SSSR sluzhat narodu i
otechestvu," Molodaya gvardiya. May 1991, pp.
8-19.
l^See, for instance, I.N. Rodionov, "Lish'
polnaia pravda mozhet ubedit'," Literatumaya
Rossiya, April 20, 1990; Iu. Borisov & G.
Samoilenko, "Voennye arsenaly: perspekiivy i
real'nost'," Literatumaya Rossiya , February 2,
1990; Marshal of the Soviet Union S.
Akhromeev, "Komu meshayut generaly,"
Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 14, 1990;
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeev,
"Byt' ili ne byt' Soyuzu?" Sovetskaya Rossiya,
February 7, 1991; Capt. 1st Rank A. Bobrakov,
"Tak chto zhe meshaet ispolnit' zakon?"
Sovetskaya Rossiya," October 21, 1990.
131b. Moseychuk, "Ye. Shaposhnikov:
'Izbavlyaemsya ot lishnego vesa'," Argument)' i
fakty, No. 38 (September 1991); Lev Kolodnyy,
"Belyy dom protiv chernoy sotni," Moskovskaya
pravda, October 4, 1991.
orders of then Commander of the Ground
Forces, General Valentin Varennikov,
one of the leaders of the August coup. 132
Russian hyper-nationalists attempted
(with some success) to involve some
members of the the Russian Orthodox
Church's hierarchy in their alliance with
the military. In March of 1991, they
organized a conference characteristically
named For Russia, United and Indivisible
(an old slogan of Russian monarchists),
which was attended by the leader of the
reactionary Russian Communist party,
Ivan Polozkov; General Varennikov;
Colonel Petrushenko, one of the leaders
of Soyuz; members of the ultra-
chauvinistic and anti-Semitic organization
Pamyat'; Russian hyper-nationalist
writers Yuriy Bondarev and Prokhanov;
as well as by some Russian Orthodox
church officials. 133 Russian hyper-
nationalist organizations were calling for
a military coup. 134
A number of attempts were made
in the months preceding the August 1991
coup to launch a mass movement on a
Russian hyper-nationalist platform. The
Soyuz group of People's Deputies
announced the formation of an Ail-Union
1
^2sergei Kiselev, "Varennikov sidit, a delo
yego zhivet," Literatumaya gazeta, November 6,
1991.
133jhe Rev. Mark Smirnov, "S parfbiletom i
krestom," Rossiya, No. 11 (March 15-22 1991).
'-^See, for instance, "Tol'ko my otdadim prikaz,
kotoryy zhdet vsya strana!" Nashe vremya, n. d.
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Popular Movement, Soyuz. 1 ^ 5 In July,
an organization named Otchizna
(Fatherland), led by retired General Boris
Tarasov, was established, with the idea
of turning it into a mass political party.
represented, just like the Communist
party, at the workplace. 136 But no
Russian hyper-nationalist mass
movement emerged. This was at least
partially due to the hyper-nationalists'
inconsistent attitude toward the future of
the Soviet Union, as well as to their
identification with the Communist party.
In 1989, Russian hyper-nationalists were
the first to call for the establishment of
separate Russian state institutions and of
a Russian Communist party. 137
Apparently, they believed that the
emergence of separate conservative
Russian institutions, especially of a
separate Russian Communist party,
would outweigh Gorbachev's reformist
135"DekIaratsiya vsesoyuznogo narodnogo
dvizheniya 'Soyuz'," Politika, No. 5 (1991).
136 Gavrilenko, "'Otchizna'—radi Otchizny,"
Krasnaya Zvezda, July 11, 1991; Lt. Gen. B.
Tarasov, "Otchizna zovet," Sovetskaya Rossiya,
July 10, 1991.
137
"za politiku narodnogo soglasiya i
rossiyskogo vozrozhdeniya. Predvybornaya
platforma bloka obshchestvenno-pairioiicheskikh
dvizheniy Rossii," Literaturnaya Rossiya,
December 29, 1989; "Plenum TsK KPSS--5-7
fevralya 1990 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet,"
Izvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 3 (March 1990), pp.
61-69. Also see Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev and
the Russian Party buro," Report on the USSR,
January 5, 1990, pp. 1-3; Vera Tolz, "Russian
Academy of Sciences to Be Set Up," Report on
the USSR, February 16, 1990, pp. 19-20; John
B. Dunlop, "Ethnic Russians on Possible
Breakup of the USSR," Report on the USSR,
March 2, 1990, pp. 16, 17.
influence upon the all-Union
institutions. 138 The hyper-nationalists,
however, continued to insist on the
preservation of the Soviet empire, which
(together with their anti-fre oiket and
anti-democratic attitudes) marked them as
little more than stand-ins for the
discredited Communist party that had
rebuilt and kept together the Russian
empire after its collapse in 1917. 139
They demonstrated no plan to reconcile
the contradiction between their "empire-
saving" proclivities, and their assertions
of Russian separate statehood in the
Union. 140 Perhaps they hoped that the
establishment of such a statehood would
serve as a catalyst for Russian nLionalist
sentiment in favor of keer e empire
(which practically coincides with
Russia's pre-Communist borders)
together.
This ambiguity was demonstrated
by the attempt, as mentioned earlier, to
establish in July of 1991 a new mass
political party, Otchizna. It was to
^Elizabeth Teague and Vera Tolz, "Moves to
Create a Russian Communist Party," Report on
the USSR, May 11, 1990, pp. 1-3; Julb
Wishnevsky, "Two RSFSR Congresses: A
Diarchy?" Report on the USSR, July 6, 1990,
pp. 1-3; Alexander Rahr, "The Russian Triangle:
Gorbachev-El'tsin-Polozkov," Report on the
USSR, July 6, 1990, pp. 4-6.
139see L. Saraskina, "Primirenie na lobnom
meste," Znamya, No. 7 (July 1990), pp. 191-
204.
l^Orjn Russian "empire-savers," see Roman
Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism,"
Problems of Communism, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July-
August 1989), pp. 17-20.
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advocate the preservation of the Union.
At the same time, it claimed to be in favor
of separate state structures for Russia,
and promised to support Yeltsin--but only
if he helped prevent the empire from
disintegrating. 141 At that time, such a
political program was utterly unrealistic:
any attempt to maintain the empire by
relying on a Russian state effectively
merged with the all-Union Communist
bureaucracy, hated both in Russia and in
the republics, was doomed.
Whatever the secret hopes of
Russian hyper-nationalists, in 1990 and
1991 the Russians appeared unwilling to
shoulder the imperial burden. According
to an opinion poll of Russians, 57.1 per
cent said that Russians should not
interfere with the development of other
nations in the USSR. 142 Demonstrations
by women in Russian cities against the
call-up of reservists in January 1990 for
police duty in Azerbaijan, and the
condemnation of Soviet military violence
in Lithuania in January 1991 by the
Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksii II
pointed again at the Russians' reluctance
to save the Communist empire. 143
The democrats quickly followed
the hyper-nationalists with their own calls
for separate Russian statehood. 144
Unlike their opponents though, the
democrats clearly expressed the need to
break with the old imperial structures in
order to liberate the Russian people from
the burdens of the empire. They
succeeded in harnessing some Russian
nationalist sentiment to their proclaimed
cause of a non-imperial Russia reformed
along Western lines. By August 20,
1991, the democrats, rather than the
Russian hyper-nationalists, were able to
mobilize a substantial segment of the
public.
The political fortunes of the
Russian hyper-nationalists and their allies
in the armed forces declined precipitously
immediately after August 1991. This
reversal, however, may turn out to be
only temporary. The demise of the
Communist party, although a temporary
setback to the hyper-nationalists, may
well represent a longer-term advantage
for them: the discredited Communist
party was a liability as a political ally.
The peculiar current circumstances under
which Russian nationhood has to be
l41 Gavrilenko, "'Otchizna'--radi Otchizny;"
Tarasov, "Otchizna zovet."
142"Sud'ba russkogo naroda," Sem'ya, No. 29
(1990).
14 3Aleksandr Kolesnikov, "Nabal Zakavkaz'ya:
ego ekho ranit vsiu stTanu," Sobesednik, No. 6
(February 1990); "Slovo patriarkha Alcksiya,"
Izvestiya, January 15, 1991.
144
"Sozdan izbiratel'nyy blok
'demokraticheskaya Rossiya'," Ogonyok, No. 6
(February 1990), pp. 17-18. After losing the
election to the Russian Congress of People's
Deputies, the hyper-nationalists bitterly
complained that the democrats "stole" their
program; see "V novykh politicheskikh
usloviyakh," Liieraturnaya Rossiya, October 26,
1990.
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established make an emergence of
Russian hyper-nationalism quite possible,
if not likely. First, it is difficult to make
the new Russian state coincide with
territories populated by ethnic Russians:
twenty-five million of them live outside
the Russian Federation, while the latter
includes significant non-Russian
enclaves, such as Tatarstan, striving for
independence. The military already
attempted to act on the side of the Russian
minority in Moldova: units of the 14th
Army there joined the militia of the
rebellious "Dniester republic," a Russian
enclave seeking secession from Moldova;
it has taken some time for the CIS
military command to restrain their forces
in Moldova. A return of the military's
alliance with the local Russians is quite
possible. 145
Second, many Russians are
shocked by the loss of territories and
populations which had been part of the
Russian empire for centuries: this
relationship, from the Russian
standpoint, was so close, that the pre-
1917 name of the whole &nrpk&—Rossiya
(Russia)—equally applied to the lands
populated by ethnic Russians and non-
Russian populations. Even the democrats
in Yeltsin's coalition find it very difficult
to stomach a new non-imperial Russian
145 Vladimir Socor, "Moldova," RFEIRL
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 7 (February 14,
1992), p. 13; RFEIRL Doily Report No. 51
(March 13, 1992).
state, such as that symbolized by
Ukrainian independence. 146 Third, in
addition to this unprecedented
humiliation, Russia faces an economic
collapse, a dire shortage of positive
national images for emulation and self-
identification, and a painful intellectual
and material dependence on the free-
market democracies—yesterday's
enemies. 147 As a result, many Russian
supporters of democracy have begun to
lament the loss of the empire. 148
In view of these powerful
multiple pressures it is hardly surprising
that various attempts to breathe new life
into a Russian hyper-nationalist
movement have been made since the
dissolution of the USSR. A Congress of
Civic and Patriotic Forces, organized by
the Russian Constitutional Democrats and
146"s t Petersburg Mayor Anatolii
Sobchak...told Russian TV on January 8 [1991]
that a Ukrainian army represents a 'landmine
under the future of all mankind' because, if
created, Ukraine would 'certainly use' its army
He said that Ukraine 'must not be permitted' to
create an army." RFEIRL Daily Report, No. 6
(January 10, 1992). This doomsday language
makes the democrat Sobchak sound like one of
his Russian hyper-nationalist critics.
147Public opinion polls confirm the Russians'
dismal self-image: when respondents in various
former republics of the Soviet Union were asked
"in which republics [of USSR] do people now
live better," the Russians were the only ones to
name Russia as the worst r ice to live, compared
to the other republics. (i.<- Aleksei Levinson,
"Gde v SSSR zhit' khorosho," l:\estiya, April
12, 1991).
14
^Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague, "Russian
Intellectuals Adjust to Loss of Empire," RFEIRL
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 8 (February 21,
1992), pp. 4-8.
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the Christian Democratic Union, was held
in Moscow on February 8-9 1992, and
reportedly called for the reestablishment
of the Russian empire. Vice-President
Rutskoi, who has emerged as a
prominent critic of free-market economic
reform and of the dissolution of the
Union, addressed the congress. 149 The
Otchizna (as mentioned earlier, created
just before the August coup, and still led
by General Tarasov) held its first
congress on February 22, 1992, and
elected General Makashov (finally
pensioned off) into its leadership. 150
Military officers, both retired and on
active duty, have been described as the
"backbone" of Otchizna. 151 On February
23, 1992, a coalition of Russian hyper-
nationalists, and conservative
Communists (with the participation of the
ubiquitous General Makashov) staged a
violent demonstration in downtown
Moscow. 152
l49RFE/RL Daily Report No. 27, February 10.
1992 and No. 31, February 14, 1992. Also see
Alexander Rahr, "Challenges to Yeltsin's
Government," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1,
No. 9 (February 28, 1992). pp. 2-4; William C.
Green, The Congress of Civic and Patriotic
Forces of Russia: an Observer's Report.
Moscow, February 8-9, 1992 (unpublished
manuscript), passim.
l^Yuliy Lebedev, "Kommunisty obreli
'Otchiznu'," Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 25,
1992.
*5
*V. Yermolin, "Dlya Rossii spasenie v
yedinstve. Dlya politikov - v omonovskikh
dubinkakh?" Krasnaya zvezda, February 25,
1992.
*" Yevgeniy Krasnikov, "23 fevralya:
kommunisty rvut tsepi OMONa," Nezavisimaya
gazeta, February 25, 1992.
The emergence of a victorious
coalition between the hyper-nationalists
and the military is, however, far from a
forgone conclusion. Even a highly
visible Russian hyper-nationalism does
not necessarily translate into a coherent
political movement. The hyper-
nationalist groups have been so far unable
to unite and are quite badly split internally
between extremists advocating violence,
and relatively more moderate elements
who hope to assume power through an
electoral process. 153 Only an effective
Russian hyper-nationalist movement can
involve the armed forces in politics,
because the military, despite all their
angry rhetoric, continue (as described
earlier) to have only a relatively narrow
sectional interest in political matters.
Conclusions
The policies of reform, initiated
by Gorbachev, have resulted in a
demilitarization of Soviet society, but the
concomitant collapse of the political
system has left the Soviet military, by
August 1991, with a greater potential for
political influence than under the old
Communist regime. The crisis of
legitimate authority, combined with the
1
"Lebedev, "Kommunisty obreli 'Otchiznu'";
Arkadiy Dubnov, Galina Koval'skaya, "Patrioty
ne ponyali drug druga?" Novoe vremya. No. 7
(February 1992); Green, The Congress of Civic
and Patriotic Forces, p. 19.
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relatively high level of popularity enjoyed
by the armed forces, has left the military
with ample opportunity for political
intervention against reform. Gorbachev's
policies have left the military with a
variety of serious grievances, more than
sufficient to motivate such an
intervention. Nevertheless, the military
did not intervene on their own, and
effectively denied their support to civilian
politicians whose anti-reform agenda was
obviously shared by a number of top
military officers.
The tradition of the Russian and
Soviet militaries has made them important
elements in the political balance of power
at this turning point of history. The same
tradition, however, required that political
intervention be legitimized by a civilian
authority and/or political movement.
When no Russian hyper-nationalist
political movement emerged to provide
legitimacy, the military pulled back from
supporting the August 1991 coup.
Moreover, the coup occurred at the
moment when the centralization of the
armed forces' command was already
being severely tested by the struggle
between the declining USSR government
and the rising star of Russia's president
Boris Yeltsin.
Civilian resistance to the coup,
however courageous, was in reality
minimal: in Moscow, less than three
percent of the population took to the
streets to defend their first elected
government. 154 The military turned out
to be the crucial element in the balance of
political power: their lack of support for
the coup was in itself a powerful political
action, because it amounted to support for
Russia's government under Mr. Yeltsin.
True to the tradition, it turned out to be
impossible to rule Russia at such a critical
juncture without the support of the
military.
What does this portend for the
future? The incentives for the military to
exert political influence (their self-
interest) and opportunities for doing so
(lack of credible civilian institutions) are
not likely to disappear in the near future.
Mass political parties are lacking, and
chances for their emergence in the near
future are small. 155 The deepening
economic crisis appears to preclude a
speedy establishment of legitimate
political institutions. The military is
frustrated by a further decline of living
standards, as well as by the disintegration
of the Soviet Armed Forces. Still,
whatever the exact outcome of the heated
arguments between Moscow and Kiev
about the ownership and command of the
former Soviet armed forces, Russia is
likely to inherit the bulk of the military
because of the size of its population, and
154Personal communication from Prof. Roman
Laba, an eyewitness to the events of the failed
coup in August, 1991.
l 55 Vera Tolz, "Political Parties in Russia,"
RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 1,
January 3, 1992, pp. 13, 14.
35
because the officer corps is
predominantly Russian. 156
The military in Russia is likely to
continue to seek political influence, but
the thrust of this search will be narrowly
limited, unless it is combined with a
strong Russian hyper-nationalist
movement. On its own, the military will
not attempt to remilitarize the Russian
society on a broad scale, beyond their
goal of obtaining as big a slice of the
budgetary pie as possible. Only if
involved with a successful mass political
movement striving to "redress
grievances" allegedly suffered by Russia
at the hands of non-Russians during the
dissolution of the empire, to protect
Russia from the sense of inferiority by at
least partial isolation from the West, and
to restore a sense of national pride by
turning towards the "glorious" past, will
the military effectively facilitate a
remilitarization of Russian society in the
short to medium term.
In any case, there are neither the
economic nor the ideological
underpinnings for militarization on the
scale of the global conflict of the Cold
War. Still, Russia faces a truly crushing
load of internal and external security
problems: internal ethnic and labor
unrest, and brewing conflicts with some
156 Russia plans to have 1.2 to 1.3 milliion
troops, more than all the other former Soviet
republics taken together. (Eric SchmM, "Russia
Is Said to Plan for a Smaller Armed Force," New
York Times, April 3, 1992. p. A6.)
of her neighbors. If the international
community fails to help Russia and her
neighbors to alleviate these problems, the
rise of Russian hyper-nationalism and
return to the traditional reliance on the
military as an paramount instrument of
foreign and domestic policies are very
likely. Just as they had in countless
crises throughout their long history, the
Russians would then have little choice but
to assign to the military an important
political role in order to compensate for
the lack of domestic stability and for the
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